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Abstract 
In our modified version of the small open economy Ramsey model, we assume that agents 
have preferences over consumption and status which, in turn, is determined by relative 
wealth. This extension potentially eliminates the standard model's counterfactual result that 
an impatient country over time mortgages all of its capital and labor income. We show that 
the steady-state values of net assets and consumption, the speed of convergence and, in 
particular, the direction of adjustment during the transition depend crucially upon the degree 
of status consciousness. The latter also influences the economy's response to macro-
economic shocks. 
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1 Introduction
An individual's utility is usually stated in terms of the absolute levels of economic variables,
such as consumption of goods and services, leisure, wealth, etc. This standard specication
is intuitively appealing and adequate to study many economic problems. There is evidence,
some of which is provided by Easterlin (1974, 1995), Clark and Oswald (1996), Oswald
(1997), and Frank (1997), to indicate, however, that an individual's economic well-being
depends crucially on his relative position, or status, in society. The idea that individuals are
motivated by status considerations is a very old one in economics and can be traced back
to thinkers such as David Hume (1978) and Thorstein Veblen (1899). After World War II
interest in this idea and its potential policy implications was maintained by authors such
as Duesenberry (1949), Scitovsky (1976), Hirsch (1976), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978),
Layard (1980), and Frank (1985a,b). In the last decade, there are an increasing number
of researchers who study status preference in a dynamic macroeconomic or endogenous
growth context. In general, there are two alternative ways in which status is modelled in
macroeconomic settings. The approach adopted by Gal (1994), Persson (1995), Harbaugh
(1996), Rauscher (1997b), Grossmann (1998), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Fisher and
Hof (2000) species that status derives from relative consumption. In contrast, Corneo and
Jeanne (1997), Rauscher (1997a), Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher (2001), and Hof
and Wirl (2001) consider that status arises from relative wealth.
1
While all these authors
model the role of status preference in a closed economy context, we will introduce relative
wealth into an otherwise standard small open economy Ramsey model. We believe this
is an important extension of this line of research due to the increasing integration of the
world economy and the greater role played by international assets in wealth accumulation.
Our work is, in addition, related to the recent Spirit of Capitalism literature, which is
exemplied by authors such as Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), Zou (1994, 1998) and
Bakshi and Chen (1996), who seek to explain growth, savings, and asset pricing behavior.
This research, based on the ideas of Max Weber (1958), views wealth accumulation as
1
It is sometimes argued that because it is easier to \see" another person's level of consumption compared
to his corresponding stock of assets, that the relative consumption approach is a more appropriate way to
model status preference than the relative wealth approach. With, however, employee stock-options plans,
among other forms of compensation, becoming more widespread, it may become easier to observe relative
wealth than was previously the case.
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the means to achieving social status, which itself enables agents to acquire nonmarket
goods that are regarded as \prizes" by society at large. As stressed by Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (1992), utility functions that include variables such as relative wealth can
then be interpreted as reduced-form versions of preferences over \deep" variables in which
dierent social organizations can lead to dierent reduced-form preferences.
A further motivation for our approach is to oer an alternative solution to a long-
standing issue in open economy macroeconomics: the fact that the representative agent
model of the small open economy|under the assumption of perfect capital mobility|
does not have a \sensible" steady-state equilibrium if the domestic rate of time preference
diers from the world interest rate. For instance, if the exogenous rate of time preference
of domestic residents exceeds the exogenous world interest rate, then agents eventually
mortgage all of their capital and labor income. In contrast, if the economy is \more pa-
tient" than all others, it acquires over time the wealth of all other countries and, indeed,
ceases to be a small open economy.
2
In order, then, for the small open economy to attain
an interior equilibrium with a positive level of consumption, equality must be imposed
between the domestic rate of time preference and the world interest rate. This condition,
however, rules out the possibility of transitional dynamics, since it also xes a particu-
lar stock of physical capital or assets. Turnovsky (1997) discusses several ways in which
the standard small open economy Ramsey model can be extended to yield an interior
long-run equilibrium and sensible transitional dynamics.
3
One approach that has been
extensively used, [see, for instance, Brock (1988), Sen and Turnovsky (1989a, 1989b, 1990),
and Frenkel, Razin, and Yuen (1996)], is to maintain the assumption that the domestic
rate of time preference equals the world interest rate, but to additionally incorporate a
convex installation cost function for domestic physical investment. This modication yields
saddlepath dynamics for physical capital and its shadow value, but|due to the specied
equality between the rate of time preference and the world interest rate|consumption
equals its steady-state value for all time t, as in the standard model. If, however, labor
supply is endogenously determined, then consumption does display saddlepath behavior
2
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 3 for a discussion of these counterfactual cases.
3
See Turnovsky (1997), chapters 2 and 3. He also points out that the potentially unpleasant features of
the standard model do not occur in the usual overlapping generations framework or its Blanchard (1985)
variant in which people, or dynasties, die o randomly. An extensive analysis of Blanchard's model is given
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 3.
2
in this context. The adjustment cost approach is, nevertheless, not without its critics,
who point out the diÆculty in reconciling covariance properties of aggregate, postwar
U.S. data with those of macroeconomic models that incorporate plausible values of the
adjustment cost parameter.
4
Another, though more controversial, approach to generate
sensible, long-run equilibria and saddlepath dynamics in the small open economy model
is to specify that representative agents possess Uzawa (1968){type, time-dependent, en-
dogenous rates of time preference. This was the method used by Obstfeld (1982) in his
work studying open economy dynamics. Authors such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky (1997) nd this formulation intuitively
unappealing, however, because a necessary condition in the innite horizon context to
generate saddlepoint dynamics is to specify that the rate of time preference increases with
the level of consumption. Obstfeld (1990), drawing on the work of Epstein (1987), among
others, oers a defense of this approach and points out its usefulness in relaxing the more
usual assumption of time-additive preferences, which is also restrictive.
Two additional, and related, approaches to addressing this issue are either to incorpo-
rate costs of holding foreign bonds or to specify an upward-sloping supply curve of debt.
Both approaches attempt to model, in a certainty equivalence framework, the macroe-
conomic implications of imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets.
The rst approach was taken by Turnovsky (1985), while the second has been adopted
in Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990). Using these specications, interior solutions
are obtained without imposing equality between the rate of time preference and the world
interest rate. Because asset stocks will then adjust slowly according to international arbi-
trage, economies with these specications exhibit saddlepath transitional dynamics. One
issue that arises in these two cases is the fact that transitional dynamics can degenerate,
depending on the macroeconomic shock in question.
5
In addition, it can be argued that
it is better to model the implications of international capital market imperfections, which
depend, at least in part, on the risk characteristics of domestic and foreign assets, in an
explicitly stochastic setting.
Our model will oer an alternative way to generate interior long-run equilibria with
4
This point is made by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
5
Fisher (1995) and Fisher and Terrell (2000) show, however, that the upward-sloping debt specication
is useful in calculating the implications of world interest rate disturbances.
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positive consumption and sensible transitional dynamics for consumption and net assets.
These properties arise due to the assumption that, in addition to own consumption, the
instantaneous utility of agents is a function of status, which depends on relative wealth.
Contrary to the existing literature, we will employ a specication of the status function
that does not rule out|by denition|steady states with negative values of nonhuman
wealth. In order to concentrate on the inuence of status preference, we will abstract from
population growth, technological progress, depreciation and installation costs of physi-
cal capital, and the heterogeneity of agents. Using an innite-horizon, perfect-foresight
framework, we will derive a symmetric equilibrium in which identical agents make the
same choices. Our formulation of status preference will result in a modied version of the
Euler equation. Its crucial feature is that the exogenous world interest rate is replaced
by an endogenous, \eective" domestic rate of return that depends also on consumption
and net assets. Weak assumptions with respect to preferences will yield saddlepoint dy-
namics. We will also incorporate a public sector in order to examine how the eects of
(balanced-budget) scal policy are inuenced by status preferences. In addition to changes
in government expenditure, we will consider total factor productivity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, rst describes our general
model of status preference and derives the symmetric, intertemporal equilibrium. Along
the stable arm, we show that consumption and net assets always move in the same direc-
tion. Moreover, as net assets accumulate, the eective rate of return declines, converging
to the subjective discount rate, which is its long-run equilibrium value. We then param-
eterize the instantaneous utility function. This will allow us to compare the implications
of dierent \degrees of status consciousness" for the steady-state values of consumption
and net assets, as well as the speed of convergence. Moreover, we show that the degree
of status consciousness determines whether net assets and consumption rise or fall during
the transitional phase.
In section 3 we will investigate how status preference aects the adjustment of pri-
vate consumption and net assets to government expenditure, and total factor productivity
shocks. A notable result in this part of our paper is that in the long run, a rise in gov-
ernment expenditure \crowds out" private consumption by more than one-for-one. This is
due to the long-run decline, attributable to status preference, in net assets, and hence, in
4
net interest income. The crowding-out eect is more pronounced, the higher is the degree
of status consciousness. We obtain an analogous result for a positive productivity shock
in which the long-run rise in consumption exceeds that of after-tax real wage income due
to higher steady-state net interest income. We close the paper with concluding remarks in
section 4.
2 The Model and Intertemporal Equilibrium
2.1 General Specication of Preferences
We begin by assuming that the small open economy is populated by a large number of
identical, innitely-lived agents. Without loss of generality, we specify that the population
size remains constant over time. In contrast to the standard model of the consumer, we
assume that each agent possesses the following general instantaneous utility function over
own consumption, c, and status, s, U = U(c; s), where
U
c
> 0, U
s
> 0, U
cc
< 0, U
ss
 0, U
cc
U
ss
  U
2
cs
 0, (1)
U
sc
U
c
  U
s
U
cc
> 0; (2)
lim
c!0
U
c
(c, s) =1, lim
c!1
U
c
(c, s) = 0. (3)
According to (1), the representative agent derives positive, though diminishing, marginal
utility from own consumption and positive and non-increasing marginal utility from status,
with the utility function U jointly concave in c and s.
6
Condition (2) imposes normality
on preferences, i.e., that the marginal rate of substitution of status for consumption,
U
s
=U
c
, depends positively on c, while (3) describes the limiting behavior of the marginal
utility of consumption. As indicated in the introduction, we assume that an individual's
status depends on both own net assets (= nonhuman wealth), a, and average net assets
of the private sector, A, i.e., s = s(a;A), where the status function is dened for all
(a;A) 2 (a;1)  (a;1).
7
Since we do not want to rule out a priori the possibility that
the economy reaches a steady state with a negative stock of private assets, as can be the
6
We will use the following notational conventions. In general, we will suppress a variable's time de-
pendence, i.e, x  x(t). The time derivative of x will be denoted by _x; a steady-state value by ~x. Unless
otherwise indicated, the partial derivative of a function F with respect to x will be denoted by F
x
.
7
Subsequently, we will use \wealth" as a shorthand for \nonhuman wealth".
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case in the standard open economy version of the Ramsey model, we will assume that a < 0.
This lower bound a can be interpreted as an indicator of domestic residents' aversion to
(or tolerance for) indebtedness. In addition, we also assume for all (a;A) 2 (a;1) (a;1)
that status increases in own wealth, decreases in average wealth, and that the marginal
status in own assets is non-increasing, i.e.:
s
a
> 0, s
A
< 0, s
aa
 0. (4)
In the bulk of macroeconomic literature on status preference, the status function takes the
following \ratio" form s(a;A) = '(a=A), '
0
> 0, '
00
 0, where a=A represents relative
wealth. Note, however, that this formulation yields counter-intuitive results if negative
levels of wealth are permitted. For instance, since s
a
= A
 1
'
0
, a negative level of average
wealth (A < 0) would imply that an increase in own wealth decreases status. Similarly,
s
A
=   (a=A
2
)'
0
implies that a rise in average wealth causes status to improve (i.e. s
A
> 0)
if the individual's wealth is negative (a < 0). To eliminate anomalies of this sort, we will
use the following representation of the status function:
s(a;A)  '

a  a
A  a

; a < 0, '
0
> 0, '
00
 0. (5)
According to (5), both own and average wealth are measured with respect to the \lower
bound", or \minimum value", a. It is easily veried that (5) satises all properties given
in (4) for all (a;A) 2 (a;1) (a;1).
In order to focus on the inuence of status preference, we make simple assumptions
regarding the open economy's technological and nancial market possibilities. Specically,
we assume that domestic physical capital is owned by domestic agents and is rented
in the perfectly competitive global capital market. In addition to physical capital, they
can accumulate wealth in the form of domestic government bonds (the domestic public
sector will be introduced below) and international assets. Agents can also borrow in the
international credit market. Own wealth a then consists of physical capital and net loans.
Because physical capital and nancial assets are perfect substitutes, they all bear the
same rate of return, equal to the exogenous world interest rate r

. Following Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky (1997), we assume that r

is constant through time.
The representative agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor and receives a real wage
6
income w that is determined in a perfectly competitive, domestic labor market. Assuming,
in addition, that the domestic public sector levies per-capita lump-sum taxes  on the
private sector, we can express the ow budget constraint of the representative agent as
_a = r

a+ w      c, (6)
where the agent's initial exogenous endowment of wealth is a
0
. Employing an innite
horizon, perfect foresight framework, the agent's maximization problem is formulated as
follows: maximize
Z
1
0
U(c; s)e
 t
dt;
where  is the exogenous rate of pure time preference and s is given by equation (5),
subject to the ow budget constraint (6), the initial condition a(0) = a
0
, and the No-
Ponzi-Game (NPG) condition lim
t!1
ae
 r

t
 0. A crucial feature of this optimization
problem is that the representative agent takes the time path of average wealth A as given.
In other words, each individual is small enough to neglect his own contribution to the
average wealth level. The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is equal to
H(c; a; ) = U

c; '

a  a
A  a

+ (r

a+ w      c);
where  is the current costate variable that denotes the current shadow value of wealth.
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum, H
c
= 0 and
_
 =    H
a
, are then
expressed as:
U
c

c; '

a  a
A  a

= ; (7)
_
 = (  r

)  U
s

c; '

a  a
A  a

'
0

a  a
A  a

1
A  a
. (8)
The assumptions made above in (1) and (5) ensure that the Hamiltonian is jointly con-
cave in the control variable c and the state variable a. This implies that if the limiting
transversality condition lim
t!1
ae
 t
= 0 holds, then the necessary conditions (7){(8)
are suÆcient for optimality.
We now describe the domestic public sector and assume, rst, that it has the following
ow budget constraint
_
b = r

b+ g   , where b is the stock of per-capita government debt,
g represents per-capita government spending, and, as indicated above,  is the level of per-
capita lump-sum taxes. The government can borrow from the domestic private sector or
7
from abroad at the prevailing world interest rate r

. We further assume that the accumula-
tion of government debt is subject to the following NPG condition lim
t!1
be
 r

t
= 0. For
simplicity, we assume that the scal policy variables g and  are constant through time.
In this special case, the NPG condition imposes the balanced-budget rule  = g + r

b
0
,
8t  0, so that the stock of government debt remains at its initial value, b
0
.
The next step is to derive the intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium. Following the
standard procedure for models of status preference with homogeneous agents, we restrict
our analysis to symmetric equilibria in which identical agents make identical choices.
Consequently, a = A holds 8t  0. From s(a; a) = '(1), it follows that in any symmetric
equilibrium, the ow of utility, U(c; '(1)), is independent of the common level of wealth.
8
As indicated, a, the wealth of the domestic private sector, consists of physical capital
and net claims on the domestic government and on the rest of the world. By denition,
the overall per-capita net foreign asset position of the open economy is then given by
(a   b
0
  k), where k denotes the domestic stock of physical capital per person. (For the
remainder of the paper, lower-case variables will refer to their economy-wide, per-capita
levels.) In this standard framework, the stock of capital held, k, and the market-clearing
real wage, w, are determined by the usual prot-maximizing conditions. If the (per-capita)
production function takes the form B  f(k), where B denotes total factor productivity,
and f(k) satises the standard neoclassical properties, which are given by f
0
(k) > 0,
f
00
(k) < 0, f(0) = 0, f(k) ! 1 as k ! 1 and the Inada conditions, then r

= Bf
0
(k)
and w = B[f(k)   kf
0
(k)]. Since both B and r

are time invariant by assumption, the
equilibrium values of the capital stock and real wage will not exhibit any transitional
behavior. In other words, the capital stock and the real wage always equal their steady-
state values
~
k and ~w. It is straightforward to show that both
~
k and ~w depend negatively
on the world interest rate r

and positively on total factor productivity B:
~
k =
~
k(r

; B),
~
k
r

= [Bf
00
(
~
k)]
 1
< 0,
~
k
B
=   f
0
(
~
k)[Bf
00
(
~
k)]
 1
> 0,
~w = ~w(r

; B), ~w
r

=  
~
k < 0, ~w
B
= f(
~
k) > 0. (9)
Substitution of a = A, w = ~w, and  = r

b
0
+ g into the two optimality conditions (7){(8)
and asset accumulation equation (6) results in the following balanced-budget, symmetric
8
This property would not be preserved if (5) were replaced by s(a;A)  '((a  a)=(A 

A)), a 6=

A.
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open economy equilibrium in which the paths of c, a, and  obey the following relationships
U
c
(c; '(1)) = ; (10)
_
 = (  r

)   U
s
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a   a
; (11)
_a = r

a+ ~w   (g + r

b
0
)  c; (12)
as well as the initial condition a(0) = a
0
and the transversality condition lim
t!1
ae
 t
=
0. Note that equation (12) corresponds to the current account balance.
9
It is useful to represent the dynamic system in terms of the control variable consump-
tion, rather than the shadow value of wealth , since this will give us an Euler equation
that we can directly compare to the Euler equation implied by the standard model in
which the quest for status does not take place. Taking the time derivative of (10), yields
_
 = U
cc
(c; '(1)) _c. Substituting this expression into (11) and using (10) results in the
following modied Euler equation
_c = c
e
(c)[r
e
(r

; c; a)  ]; (13)
where the eective elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
e
and the eective domestic,
or internal, rate of return on assets r
e
, respectively, are given by

e
(c)   
U
c
(c; '(1))
cU
cc
(c; '(1))
, r
e
(r

; c; a)  r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
: (14)
Using the fact that
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
=
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
s
a
(a; a) =
U
s
(c; s(a;A))
U
c
(c; s(a;A))
s
a
(a;A)




a=A
;
it follows that the eective rate of return r
e
equals the sum of the world interest rate r

and the marginal rate of substitution of own assets a for consumption c as perceived by
the representative agent in a symmetric state in which a = A holds (hereafter, symmetric
MRS). In general, the MRS of a for c represents the additional return to saving due to sta-
tus preference in which the incremental ow of utility from an extra unit of savings, equal
to U
s
(c; s(a;A))s
a
(a;A), is converted, through division by U
c
(c; s(a;A)), into equivalent
units of the consumption good. Dierentiating the expression for r
e
(r

; c; a) with respect
9
The current account balance equals the rate of change of the open economy's net foreign asset position,
d(a  b  k)=dt. Since, however, b = b
0
and k =
~
k, 8t  0, the current account balance reduces to _a:
9
to c and a, it is straightforward to show that the symmetric MRS, and hence the eective
rate of return, is a positive function of consumption and a negative function of assets. The
partial derivatives of the eective rate of return with respect to consumption and assets
are given, respectively, by:
r
e
c
(c; a) =
U
sc
(c; '(1))U
c
(c; '(1))   U
s
(c; '(1))U
cc
(c; '(1))
[U
c
(c; '(1))]
2
'
0
(1)
a  a
> 0, (15)
r
e
a
(c; a) =  
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
(a  a)
2
< 0. (16)
The positive sign of r
e
c
is due to the normality assumption stated in (2), which states
that the MRS of status for consumption, U
s
(c; s)=U
s
(c; s), is an increasing function of
consumption c for any given value of status s. In contrast, the negative sign of r
e
a
depends
on the specication of the status function (5). In particular, since
ds
a
(a; a)
da
= s
aa
(a; a) + s
aA
(a; a) =  
'
0
(1)
(a  a)
2
< 0;
it follows that if the economy moves from one symmetric state to another in which each
individual has a greater level of wealth, then the marginal status of own wealth, given by
s
a
(a; a), and, hence, the symmetric MRS of a for c declines for any value of c. Finally, we
can show that the transversality condition in this context can be re-expressed as:
10
lim
t!1

a (t) exp

 
Z
t
0
r
e
(r

; c(v); a(v)) dv

= 0:
Since the eective rate of return r
e
(r

; c; a) is not xed parametrically, it is possible in
our model for the small open economy to have saddlepoint stable transitional dynamics. By
way of contrast, assume, instead, that agents have standard concave preferences solely over
own consumption, i.e., U = U(c), U
0
> 0, U
00
< 0. The Euler equation (13) then collapses
to _c = c(c)(r

 ), where (c)   U
0
(c)=[cU
00
(c)] is the standard elasticity of substitution
and where lim
t!1
ae
 r

t
= 0 becomes the appropriate transversality condition in this case.
Since r

and  are both xed constants, the standard Euler equation implies that for the
small open economy to reach an interior long-run equilibrium with positive consumption,
the equality r

=  must be imposed. But this means, however, that the small open
economy exhibits no transitional dynamics, since _c = _a = 0, 8t  0, in this case. If, on
10
Because we are only concerned with steady states in which a takes a nite value, the modied transver-
sality condition implies that the NPG holds with equality.
10
the other hand, r

6= , the small open economy exhibits the \counter-intuitive" dynamic
behavior we described in the introduction: either mortgaging all its net labor income if
r

<  or eventually ceasing to be a small economy if r

> .
11
In our model of status
preference in which consumption dynamics depends on the eective rate of return, agents
are, by assumption, impatient in the sense that r

< . Nevertheless, we will show that the
small open economy possesses steady states with positive levels of consumption without
eliminating transitional dynamic behavior.
12
It is instructive at this point in the paper to compare the eective rate of return in
equation (14) with the upward-sloping debt function discussed in the introduction. In
general, this relationship assumes the following functional form r(z) = r

+  (z), where
z    (a   b
0
  k) represents the stock of net international debt, and  () > 0,  
0
> 0,
 
00
> 0. The domestic interest rate r(z) equals the sum of the world interest rate r

and the country-specic \risk premium"  (z) that increases with z.
13
Observe that our
formulation of the eective rate of return in equation (14) and the upward-sloping debt
function have two common properties. First, according to both relationships an increase
in indebtedness raises the eective domestic rate of return on saving. Second, in a steady
state without endogenous growth r

+  (~z) =  with  (~z) > 0 will obtain. Hence, as in
our model, a necessary condition for the existence of such a steady state is that domestic
agents are impatient in the sense that r

< . Nevertheless, the upward-sloping debt
function does not explicitly arise|unlike the eective rate of return in (14)|from the
optimizing behavior of agents and, in particular, does not depend on preferences and
consumption. This distinction is important (see footnote 26) in determining the response
of the economy, for example, to scal shocks.
11
If r

< , the optimal paths of assets and consumption exhibit the following limiting behavior:
lim
t!1
a(t) =  
~w   r

b
0
  g
r

=  
~w   
r

< 0, lim
t!1
c(t) = 0.
12
It must be stressed that our results depend critically on the fact that status is a function of relative
wealth. If status is, instead, a function of relative consumption, i.e., s(c; C) = '(c=C), where C represents
average consumption, the Euler equation becomes _c = c
e;c
(c)(r

  ), where the eective elasticity of
intertemporal substitution 
e;c
(c) takes a form distinct from the expression in equation (14) [for mathe-
matical details, see Fisher and Hof (2000)]. Since the eective rate of return is simply the world interest
rate r

in the relative consumption case, the economy would be in either of the two counter-intuitive cases
described above, unless r

= .
13
Alternative formulations of this relationship scale net debt by output or the capital stock.
11
In terms of the Uzawa model, the economy's consumption dynamics depend [see, for
instance, Turnovsky (1997)] on what can be called the economy's eective rate of time
preference, i.e., 
e
=  (U(c)), where 
0
> 0, 
00
> 0,    U(c)
0
> 0. As we discussed
in the introduction, the eective rate of time preference in the Uzawa framework is a
positive function of ow utility, which, in turn, depends positively on own consumption
c. The positive relationship between 
e
and c is a necessary condition for the economy
to possess a saddlepoint steady state. Because the relationship  (U(~c)) = r

will hold in
the steady state, one potential limitation of the Uzawa model in the small open economy
context is that long-run value of consumption ~c will depend|aside from the properties of
the function  ()|solely, and positively, on the world interest rate r

. This implies that
neither changes in domestic scal policy nor productivity shocks will aect ~c in the Uzawa
model.
Returning to our analysis, we next consider steady states (~a; ~c) of the small open
economy in which the long-run level of consumption is strictly positive, c = ~c > 0. In
graphical terms|with a plotted on the horizontal axis and c plotted on the vertical axis
in Figure 1|these are determined by the points of intersections between the _a = 0 line,
given by
c = r

a+ ~w   (r

b
0
+ g); (17)
and the _c = 0 locus implicitly dened by r
e
(r

; c; a) = . Observe that the latter can be
rewritten as:
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
=   r

, (18)
where the left-hand side of (18) is the symmetric MRS of own assets for consumption and,
as indicated, (   r

) > 0 holds by assumption. We know from the above analysis that
r
e
and the symmetric MRS depend positively on c. If, in addition, the symmetric MRS
satises the weakened Inada conditions
lim
c!0

U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a

<   r

< lim
c!1

U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a

; a 2 (a;1);
which are equivalent to lim
c!0
r
e
(r

; c; a) <  < lim
c!1
r
e
(r

; c; a), then for any given
value of net assets a 2 (a;1), there exists a unique positive value of consumption c
that solves r
e
(r

; c; a) = . In graphical terms, this means that the _c = 0 locus does
12
not intersect the horizontal axis within the interval (a;1). Since r
e
c
> 0 and r
e
a
< 0,
(dc=da)j
_c=0
=   r
e
a
=r
e
c
> 0, i.e., the _c = 0 locus is positively sloped in the (a; c){space.
14
Moreover, it is obvious from equation (17) that the _a = 0 line has a constant slope equal
to the world interest rate, i.e., (dc=da)j
_a=0
= r

> 0, with a horizontal intercept given by
  ( ~w  r

b
0
  g)=r

=   ( ~w  )=r

. The following stability analysis will demonstrate that
a steady state (~a; ~c)| in which ~c > 0| is a saddlepoint equilibrium if and only if _c = 0
locus cuts the _a = 0 from below at (~a; ~c).
Linearizing the system (12){(13) about the steady state (~a; ~c), the dynamics can be
approximated by the following matrix dierential equation:
0
B
@
_a
_c
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
r

  1
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a) ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
1
C
A
0
B
@
a  ~a
c  ~c
1
C
A
. (19)
The stability properties of (19) can be investigated by examining its characteristic poly-
nomial, which is given by
0 = (r

  )[~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  ] + ~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a) (20)
= 
2
  [tr (J)]+ det (J); (21)
where the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix J in (19) are given by
tr (J) = r

+ ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a) > 0, det (J) = ~c
e
(~c)[r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)]: (22)
As is well-known, the eigenvalues 
1
, 
2
satisfy both tr (J) = 
1
+
2
and det (J) = 
1

2
.
15
For a steady state (~a; ~c) to be a saddlepoint, det (J) must be negative and, consequently,
so must be the term in brackets in (22). As illustrated in Figure 1, this is the case as long
as the _c = 0 locus cuts the _a = 0 locus from below at the steady-state equilibrium (~a; ~c).
That is:
det (J) < 0,
dc
da




a=~a, _c=0
=
  r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
> r

=
dc
da




_a=0
.
14
Figure 1 depicts the special case in which the _c = 0 locus describes a linear relationship. This need
not be the case for the general model of preferences.
15
From r
e
c
> 0 and r
e
a
< 0 it follows that
[tr (J)]
2
  4 det (J) = [r

  ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
is strictly positive. Hence, both eigenvalues are real numbers, irrespective of the sign of det (J).
13
Under this condition, the steady-state equilibrium (~a; ~c) is a saddlepoint, with 
1
< 0,

2
> 0, j
1
j < 
2
.
16
Using standard methods, we then obtain the following linearized
solution for assets and the stable saddlepath describing the dynamics of (a; c)
a = ~a  (~a  a
0
)e

1
t
;
c  ~c = (r

  
1
)(a  ~a) =  
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a); (23)
where a adjusts from an exogenous initial stock, a
0
.
17
The stable saddlepath, denoted by
XX in Figure 1, is positively sloped, which implies that consumption and wealth move
in the same direction, i.e., sgn ( _c) = sgn ( _a). These relationships are illustrated in Figure
1, which is the phase diagram of the dynamic system using our general specication of
preferences.
18
In Figure 1 the long-run saddlepoint equilibrium is given by point D and
corresponds to a positive steady-state level of assets. Observe, in addition, that we have
indicated an initial equilibrium (a
0
; c(0)) along the saddlepath XX that lies to the north-
east of D, which implies that the economy will run current account decits in transition
to point D.
We can also use our solution for the stable saddlepath XX to describe the dynamic
adjustment of the eective rate of return r
e
(r

; c; a). At rst glance, whether r
e
rises or falls
towards its steady-state value  appears ambiguous, since while sgn ( _c) = sgn ( _a) along
XX, the partial derivatives r
e
c
and r
e
a
are of opposite sign, i.e., r
e
c
> 0, r
e
a
< 0. Nevertheless,
linearizing r
e
(r

; c; a) about the steady-state equilibrium, substituting for (c ~c) from (23)
in the resulting expression and using (20), we obtain the following relationship between
r
e
and a:
r
e
(r

; c; a)    =
(r

  
1
)
1
~c
e
(~c)
(a  ~a) =  

1
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a): (24)
This equation implies that if a < ~a (resp. a > ~a), then r
e
>  (resp. r
e
< ) along the
stable arm. During the transition to the steady state r
e
and a move in opposite directions,
16
The opposite case in which the _a = 0 locus cuts the _c = 0 locus from below implies, in contrast, that
the steady state (~a; ~c) is an unstable node with 0 < 
1
< 
2
.
17
The two equivalent representations of the saddlepath in (23) are derived from (20).
18
In Figure 1 the arrows can be interpreted as follows: above the _c = 0 locus, r
e
>  obtains. According
to (13), it is optimal for the agent to choose a rising consumption path, i.e., _c > 0. Above the _a = 0 locus,
the agent dissaves, i.e., _a < 0, since consumption exceeds the sum of after-tax wage income and net interest
income. Conversely, _c < 0 below the _c = 0 locus, and _a > 0 below the _a = 0 locus.
14
i.e., sgn ( _r
e
) =   sgn ( _a). This suggests that the inuence of net assets on the eective of
return dominates that of consumption after t > 0.
2.2 Parameterized Model
To describe in further detail the role of status in inuencing the dynamic equilibrium,
it is convenient to parameterize the preferences of the representative agent. We use a
generalized version of the preferences employed by Futagami and Shibata (1998) and
assume that the instantaneous utility function takes the following functional form
U(c; s) =
1
1  


c

s


1 
  1

; (25)
where  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, 1   (1   ) > 0, 1   (1   )  0, 1   ( + )(1   )  0.
However, the form of U(c; s) introduced in (25) requires the additional assumption of
' > 0 in order to ensure that s > 0.
19
Our assumptions guarantee that (25) satises the
restrictions given in (1){(3). Under this specication, the parameterized expressions for
the eective elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the eective rate of return are
equal, respectively, to 
e
= [1  (1  )]
 1
> 0 and
r
e
= r

+ (=)
c
a   a
, where  
'
0
(1)
'(1)
. (26)
From (26), note that the parameter  depends positively on  as well as on the deriva-
tive '
0
(1). The higher is , the more important is asset accumulation for status-seeking
individuals.
20
Observe, in addition, that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
e
is
independent of  as well as independent of the level of consumption c. From (26), it follows
that the _c = 0 locus, implicitly dened by r
e
= , assumes the following linear form:
c = (=)(   r

)(a  a). (27)
Observe that the _c = 0 locus will cut the a-axis at a. This reects that fact as a ! a;
c ! 0. Clearly, the _c = 0 locus is \atter", the greater is the parameter  that scales the
importance of status in our model. Recalling from (17) that the _a = 0 line corresponds to
19
In the closed-economy model studied by Futagami and Shibata (1998) a = 0.
20
The intuition is clear: the greater is , the higher is the MRS of status for private consumption
[U
s
(c; s)=U
s
(c; s) = (=)(c=s)] and the greater is the derivative '
0
(1), the higher is the marginal status of
own assets as perceived by the representative agent in symmetric states [s
a
(a; a) = '
0
(1)(a  a)
 1
].
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the equation c = r

a+ ~w  g  r

b
0
, we can show that the expressions for the steady-state
values of consumption ~c and the excess of assets over their lower bound (~a  a) are equal
to:
~a  a =
(=)r

  [1 + (=)]r


a+
~w   r

b
0
  g
r


; (28)
~c =
(  r

) r

  [1 + (=)]r


a+
~w   r

b
0
  g
r


. (29)
For the remainder of the paper, we will restrict our analysis to the case in which preferences
obey the following two conditions:
a >  
~w   r

b
0
  g
r

=  
~w   
r

;   [1 + (=)]r

> 0. (30)
If the restrictions in (30) are met, then the steady state (~a; ~c) described by the solutions
(28){(29) satises the following properties: i) it is economically sensible in the sense that
consumption ~c is positive and the stock of assets ~a exceeds its lower bound a, ii) it is a
saddlepoint. The rst condition in (30) requires that the lower bound on assets exceeds
the negative of the steady-state value of discounted, after-tax wage income. Graphically,
it ensures that the point of intersection of the _c = 0 locus with the a-axis lies to the right
of the corresponding point of intersection of the _a = 0 locus. The second condition in (30)
places, in eect, a lower bound on the rate of time preference  for given values of , ,
and r

. Equally, this condition|if rewritten as  < (=r

)(  r

)|can be interpreted as
imposing an upper bound on  for given values of , , and r

. In Fig. 1, it guarantees
that the _c = 0 locus is steeper than the _a = 0 locus.
21
We close this subsection with an analysis of the role played by the status parameter  in
determining the direction of the economy's adjustment from a given initial stock of assets
a
0
. The role of  in inuencing the economy's speed of adjustment will also be considered.
Figure 2 illustrates two possible paths consumption and net assets can take starting from
a given positive value of a
0
, under the assumption that all parameters are the same except
for the status parameter . This implies that the _a = 0 locus will be identical in both
cases, while the _c = 0 locus will dier only according to its slope, which, as indicated,
depends negatively on the value of . In Figure 2 the saddlepath EF corresponds to a
21
If the signs of the restrictions in (30) were both reversed, the steady state would be meaningful in the
sense that ~c > 0 and (~a a) > 0, although the long-run equilibrium would be an unstable node. If, instead,
only one of the conditions is violated, then a sensible steady-state equilibrium will not exist.
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\low" value of , denoted by 
low
, and takes the economy to a steady-state equilibrium in
which the stock of net assets of the becomes negative, i.e., ~a < 0. In contrast, the path
E
0
F
0
corresponds to a \high" value of , denoted by 
high
.
22
Along the saddlepath E
0
F
0
the economy will run current account surpluses that will improve the net asset position
of the private sector to ~a
0
in the long run, which will also lead to a higher level ~c
0
of
steady-state consumption.
23
Graphically, the 
low
case in Figure 2 is illustrated by the
relatively steep _c (
low
) = 0 locus, while the corresponding 
high
case is depicted by its
atter counterpart and is denoted by _c (
high
) = 0.
To consider the way in which status preference aects the speed of adjustment along the
saddlepath, we will make use of the characteristic polynomial. Substituting the appropriate
expressions for 
e
, r
e
a
, and r
e
c
into equations (22), we derive the following parameterized
expressions for the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix J:
tr (J) = r

+
  r

1  (1   )
; det (J) =  
(  r

)f  [1 + (=)]r

g
[1  (1  )](=)
< 0:
From (23), it is clear that the slope of the stable saddlepath, r

  
1
, becomes \steeper",
the larger in absolute value is the negative eigenvalue 
1
. The question remains how j
1
j is
aected by the parameter : It is straightforward to calculate that @j
1
j=@ < 0. In other
words, an increase in the parameter , corresponding to an increase in the importance of
status, reduces the stable speed of adjustment j
1
j. Consequently, not only is the slope of
the _c = 0 locus reduced by an increase in , but so also is the slope of the saddlepath.
We depict this in Figure 2 where the saddlepath E
0
F
0
corresponding to the 
high
case is
atter than the saddlepath EF corresponding to the 
low
case. As we shall see in the next
section, a higher of  can also have the eect of \magnifying" the steady-state response of
the economy to government expenditure and total factor productivity shocks.
3 The Role of Status in Macroeconomic Adjustment
In this section we will describe the role of status in determining the response of the small
open economy to the changes (shocks) in the levels of government expenditure and total
22
The \prime" notation here denotes the alternative equilibrium with a high value of , 
high
. In section
3, Figures 3 and 4, the variable ~x
0
will denote the new, long-run value of a variable x in response to a
permanent shift in government expenditure or total factor productivity.
23
There will in general exist a critical value of  for which ~a = 0:
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factor productivity. We will only consider shocks that are permanent and unanticipated.
This implies that the change in the relevant exogenous variables will be implemented at
t = 0, with the exogenous variable remaining forever at its new, higher level as the economy
moves along its perfect foresight saddlepath. In our subsequent discussion, we will present
the steady-state comparative expressions of both the general and the parameterized model,
since we can extract insights from both representations. We will focus on the response of
net assets ~a and consumption ~c. The comparative statics relationships of the general model
will be calculated using the following steady-state system of equations
~c = r

~a+ ~w   (r

b
0
+ g), r
e
(r

; ~c; ~a) = ; (31)
where ~w = ~w(r

; B). Note that (31) corresponds to (17){(18)|the equations describing
the _a = 0 and _c = 0 loci|expressed in terms of the steady-state values of ~a and ~c. To
determine the comparative statics expressions of the parameterized model, we will use the
solutions (28){(29) for (~a  a) and ~c.
3.1 Fiscal Shocks
We discuss in this subsection the eect of a permanent increase in domestic government
expenditure on the steady-state values of net assets and consumption. In the general
preference framework, dierentiation of (31) with respect to g yields
@~a
@g
=  
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	
< 0,
@~c
@g
=
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
	
=  

1 +
r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	

<   1; (32)
where 	 =   [~c
e
(~c)]
 1
det(J) > 0. The inequalities in (32), which state that an increase
in government expenditure decreases the steady-state stock of net assets and the level of
consumption, follow from r
e
c
> 0 and r
e
a
< 0, along with the fact that we only consider
saddlepoint-stable long-run equilibria. In the parameterized model, the corresponding ex-
pressions are equal to:
24
@~a
@g
=  
=
  [1 + (=)] r

< 0;
@~c
@g
=  
  r

  [1 + (=)] r

<   1: (33)
It is clear that the absolute values of the government expenditure multipliers for net
assets and consumption, j@~a=@gj and j@~c=@gj, depend positively on the status parameter
24
The inequalities in (33) follow from our assumption (  r

) > 0 and the second condition in (30).
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. Hence, the long-run decline in net assets and consumption is greater, the larger is . As
we have discussed, a larger value of  corresponds graphically to a \atter" _c = 0 locus. A
atter _c = 0 locus implies, in turn, that greater changes in the values of ~c and ~a take place
subsequent to a given shift in the _a = 0 locus. Furthermore, observe from both (32) and
(33) that the long-run fall in consumption exceeds the rise in government expenditure. In
other words, permanent government expenditure shocks \crowd out" private consumption
by more than one-for-one in the long run.
We can easily explain this result using Figure 3, in which the increase in government
spending g causes a downward shift in the _a = 0 locus, equal to g. This reects the
fact that lump-sum taxes  must be increased one-for-one with g in order to maintain
domestic scal balance. While the pre-tax real wage ~w = ~w(r

; B) is independent of
changes in domestic scal policy, the after-tax real wage ~w    declines by g units, i.e.,
( ~w   ) =   =  g.
Because the decline in initial consumption|as illustrated in Figure 3 by the jump
from point G to point H|falls short of the reduction in the after-tax real wage, the
private sector must dissave. This initial fall in consumption causes the symmetric MRS of
status for consumption to decline, i.e., status loses in importance relative to consumption.
Consequently, the eective rate of return r
e
on saving falls below its steady-state value .
During the ensuing transition to the new steady state, private agents run down their stock
of net assets and continue to reduce consumption, i.e., _a < 0 and _c < 0. As the economy
moves along the new stable arm from point H to point I, the eective domestic interest
rate then increases, returning to its unchanged steady-state value .
25
To summarize, it
is the combination of the fall in after-tax real wage income and the long-run reduction in
net interest income that causes consumption to decline in the steady state by more than
the increase in government expenditure. This \excessive" reduction in consumption is also
clear in Figure 3 in which the fall in steady-state consumption from ~c to ~c
0
exceeds the
vertical shift in the _a = 0 locus.
26
25
Recall from (24), that sgn ( _r
e
) =   sgn ( _a) holds along the stable arm.
26
For the Uzawa model, it is straightforward to show that an increase in g raises ~a and leaves ~c unchanged.
On the other hand, in the upward-sloping debt framework, a rise in g causes a one-for-one decline in ~c,
with ~a left unaected. In our view, the dynamic response of the economy under our specication is more
general, because the long-run adjustment falls on both consumption and net assets. Analogous results hold
for the productivity shock discussed in the next subsection.
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3.2 Productivity Shocks
We will next consider the impact of a permanent increase in total factor productivity B
on the steady-state values of net asset holdings and consumption. In contrast to scal
shocks, changes in B will aect the pre-tax real wage ~w, @ ~w=@B = f(
~
k) > 0 [see (9)],
while leaving lump-sum tax payments  unchanged. Dierentiating equations (31) with
respect to B, we obtain
@~a
@B
=
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	
@ ~w
@B
> 0;
@~c
@B
=
  r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
	
@ ~w
@B
=

1 +
r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	

@ ~w
@B
>
@ ~w
@B
: (34)
These relationships state that an improvement in productivity raises both the steady-
state stock of assets and the level of consumption. Observe that the rise in steady-state
consumption exceeds that of real wage income, which is due to the fact that steady-state
interest income also increases. If, instead, preferences assume our modied Futagami-
Shibata form, then the multipliers for ~a and ~c become:
@~a
@B
=
=
  [1 + (=)] r

@ ~w
@B
> 0;
@~c
@B
=
  r

  [1 + (=)] r

@ ~w
@B
>
@ ~w
@B
. (35)
Using Figure 4, it is straightforward to explain these results. The improvement in produc-
tivity causes an upward shift in the _a = 0 locus, equal to the change in the pre-tax real
wage:  ~w = (@ ~w=@B)B = f(
~
k)B. This shift in the _a = 0 locus leads to a new intersec-
tion with the _c = 0 locus at point P and results in a new steady state with higher values
of net assets and consumption, ~a
0
and ~c
0
. Nevertheless, the initial increase in consumption
from point M to point N in Figure 4 is less than the increase in real wage income, which
means that the private sector devotes part of this gain in real resources to asset accumu-
lation. The initial rise in consumption is also reected in the corresponding increase in the
symmetric MRS of status for consumption. Because status gains in importance compared
to consumption in the case of a permanent increase in B, the eective rate of return r
e
jumps above its given steady-state value . As the economy proceeds along the new stable
arm between points N to point P in Figure 4, the private sector accumulates net assets,
with consumption, consistent with the Euler equation (13), continuing to rise, i.e., _a > 0
and _c > 0. Due to the saddlepath relationship sgn ( _r
e
) =   sgn ( _a), the eective rate of
return declines, converging to its long run value . As in the previous case of a scal ex-
pansion, the long-run increase in consumption is the sum of two eects: i) the immediate
20
rise in after-tax real wage income due to the increase in B; ii) the gain in net interest
income that is a consequence of the economy's accumulation of net assets. This result is
also depicted in Figure 4, since the increase in steady-state consumption from ~c to ~c
0
is
greater than the upward shift in the _a = 0 locus.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the implications of modifying the standard version of the small
open economy Ramsey model by introducing preferences that depend on status as well as
on own consumption. Following the branch of the macroeconomic literature that identies
status with relative wealth, we specied that status depends on the comparison between
own and average holdings of net assets. What conclusions were we able to draw from our
open economy model of status preference? First, we showed that our model eliminates
one counter-intuitive property of the standard open economy Ramsey framework: that an
impatient economy|in the sense that its pure rate of time preference exceeds the world
interest rate|mortgages over time all its human and nonhuman wealth. Our economy, in
contrast, potentially possesses an interior long-run equilibrium and saddlepath dynamics
for consumption and net assets. The key variable that generates economic dynamics in our
framework is the domestic eective rate of return, which, in addition to the world interest
rate, depends on the private sector's willingness to substitute net assets for consumption.
Next, using both general and parameterized specications of the instantaneous utility
function, we analyzed how status preference aects the short- and long-run properties of
the open economy. Among our notable results, we found that the \importance" of asset
accumulation for status seeking|dened in the parameterized specication|is crucial in
determining the steady-state values of consumption and net assets. This, in turn, implies
that even the direction of the economy's adjustment during the transition to the steady
27
Additional comparative statics exercises for this model are, of course, possible. It is, for example,
straightforward to show that while an increase in the pure rate of time preference  lowers both ~c and ~a, an
increase in the aversion to indebtedness a, raises both ~c and ~a. The eects of a permanent increase in the
world interest rate are, in contrast, signicantly more complex. In particular, not only the quantitative,
but also the qualitative response of ~c and ~a depend on the importance of status. Among other results, we
are able to demonstrate that a suÆcient, but not necessary, condition for a rise in r

to increase both ~c
and ~a is that the economy is an international net creditor, i.e., (~a  b
0
 
~
k) > 0. This will be the case if
the quest for status is suÆciently strong.
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state is critically inuenced by how \strong" is the private sector's status motive. We nally
analyzed the role of status preference in determining the adjustment of the economy to
macroeconomic shocks. This was illustrated by considering government expenditure and
total factor productivity disturbances. We found that a permanent increase in government
expenditure, nanced by a rise in lump-sum taxes, \crowds out" private consumption by
more than one-for-one. This is due to the fact that in response to this shift in scal policy,
the private sector dissaves during the transition to the steady state. The resulting loss of net
interest income augments the drop in after-tax real wage income due to higher lump-sum
taxes and results in the \excessive" crowding out of private consumption. Analogously, a
permanent improvement in total factor productivity leads to a long-run increase in private
consumption that is greater than the rise in after-tax real wage income. This is caused by
the accumulation of net assets during the transition to the steady state that, consequently,
also raises net interest income.
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5 Mathematical Appendix
5.1 Properties of the status function (5)
On page 6 we state that the status function (5),
s(a;A)  '

a  a
A  a

, a < 0, '
0
> 0, '
00
 0,
which is dened for all (a;A) 2 (a;1) (a;1), satises all properties given in (4), s
a
> 0,
s
A
< 0, s
aa
 0, for all (a;A) 2 (a;1) (a;1). From
s
a
(a;A) = '
0

a  a
A  a

1
A  a
> 0; (36)
s
aa
(a;A) = '
00

a  a
A  a

1
(A  a)
2
 0; (37)
s
A
(a;A) =  '
0

a  a
A  a

a  a
(A  a)
2
< 0; (38)
it is obvious that our statement is true.
5.2 The properties of the current-value Hamiltonian
On page 7 we state that due to the assumptions made in (1) and (5), the current-value
Hamiltonian,
H(c; a; ) = U

c; '

a  a
A  a

+ (r

a+ w      c); (39)
is jointly concave in the control variable c and the state variable a. We also state that
in this case the necessary conditions for an interior optimum, H
c
= 0 and
_
 =   H
a
,
(7) and (8), are suÆcient for optimality, as long as the limiting transversality condition
lim
t!1
ae
 t
= 0 holds.
The rst statement can be veried as follows: taking derivatives of (39) we obtain:
H
c
= U
c

c; '

a  a
A  a

  ;
H
cc
= U
cc

c; '

a  a
A  a

;
H
ca
= U
cs

c; '

a  a
A  a

'
0

a  a
A  a

1
A  a
;
H
a
= U
s

c; '

a  a
A  a

'
0

a  a
A  a

1
A  a
+ r

;
A { 1
Haa
=
1
(A  a)
2
(
U
ss

c; '

a  a
A  a

'
0

a  a
A  a

2
+ U
s

c; '

a  a
A  a

'
00

a  a
A  a

)
:
Using a more compact notation, we have
H
cc
= U
cc
; H
ca
=
1
A  a
U
cs
'
0
; H
aa
=
1
(A  a)
2
h
U
ss
 
'
0

2
+ U
s
'
00
i
:
From these results, it follows that
H
cc
H
aa
 H
2
ca
=
1
(A  a)
2
h
U
cc
U
ss
  U
2
cs

 
'
0

2
+ U
cc
U
s
'
00
i
:
The assumptions made in (1), U
c
> 0, U
s
> 0, U
cc
< 0, U
ss
 0, U
cc
U
ss
  U
2
cs
 0, and in
(5), '
0
> 0, '
00
 0, ensure that
H
cc
< 0; H
aa
 0; H
cc
H
aa
 H
2
ca
 0: (40)
Consequently, the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in c and a. This, in turn, implies that
the maximized Hamiltonian H
max
is concave in the state variable a (although this is
clear, a proof will be given below). As is well-known from the theory of optimal control,
this property of the maximized Hamiltonian H
max
ensures that as long as the limiting
transversality condition lim
t!1
ae
 t
= 0 holds, the necessary conditions for an interior
optimum, H
c
= 0 and
_
 =  H
a
, (7) and (8), are suÆcient for optimality.
In the rest of this subsection we will show that if the Hamiltonian satises (40), then
the maximized HamiltonianH
max
is concave in a. First, the necessary optimality condition
H
c
(c; a; ) = 0 can be solved for c in the form c = c^ (a; ), where
c^
a
(a; ) =  
H
ca
(c^ (a; ) ; a; )
H
cc
(c^ (a; ) ; a; )
: (41)
The maximized Hamiltonian is given by H
max
= H
max
(a; )  H(c^ (a; ) ; a; ). Invoking
the envelope theorem we have
H
max
a
(a; ) = H
a
(c^(a; ); a; ):
Dierentiating once more with respect to a we obtain:
H
max
aa
(a; ) = H
ac
(c^(a; ); a; )c^
a
(a; ) +H
aa
(c^(a; ); a; ):
Substitution of (41) and rearranging yields
H
max
aa
(a; ) =
H
cc
(c^ (a; ) ; a; )H
aa
(c^(a; ); a; )   [H
ca
(c^ (a; ) ; a; )]
2
H
cc
(c^ (a; ) ; a; )
:
From (40) it follows that H
max
aa
 0, i.e., the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in the
state variable a.
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5.3 The properties of
~
k =
~
k(r

; B) and ~w = ~w(r

; B) [equation (9)]
The steady-state values of
~
k and ~w are implicitly dened by
r

= Bf
0

~
k

; ~w = B
h
f

~
k

 
~
kf
0

~
k
i
: (42)
It is clear that
~
k =
~
k(r

; B) and ~w = ~w(r

; B). First, implicit dierentiation of (42) with
respect to r

yields
1 = Bf
00

~
k

~
k
r

; ~w
r

=  B
~
kf
00

~
k

~
k
r

:
Solving for
~
k
r

and ~w
r

we calculate
~
k
r

= [Bf
00
(
~
k)]
 1
; ~w
r

=  
~
k < 0:
Second, implicit dierentiation of (42) with respect to B yields
0 = f
0

~
k

+Bf
00

~
k

~
k
B
; ~w
B
= f

~
k

 
~
kf
0

~
k

 B
~
kf
00

~
k

~
k
B
:
Solving for
~
k
B
and ~w
B
we obtain
~
k
B
=  f
0

~
k
 h
Bf
00

~
k
i
 1
; ~w
B
= f

~
k

:
5.4 The derivation of the modied Euler equation (13){(14)
Dierentiation of (10), U
c
(c; '(1)) = , with respect to time t yields
U
cc
(c; '(1)) _c =
_
: (43)
Substituting (10) and (43) into (11),
_
 = (  r

)   U
s
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a   a
;
we obtain
_c =  
1
U
cc
(c; '(1))

(r

  )U
c
(c; '(1)) + U
s
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a   a

:
In order to allow for immediate comparisons with the standard Euler equation for con-
sumption, it will be convenient to rewrite this dierential equation as
_c = c

 
U
c
(c; '(1))
cU
cc
(c; '(1))
 
r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
  

:
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Introducing the denitions of the eective elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
e
and
the eective domestic, or internal, rate of return on assets r
e
, respectively, given by (14),

e
(c)   
U
c
(c; '(1))
cU
cc
(c; '(1))
, r
e
(r

; c; a)  r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
;
we obtain the modied Euler equation (13), _c = c
e
(c)[r
e
(r

; c; a)   ]:
5.5 The symmetric MRS
On page 9 we state that
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
=
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
s
a
(a; a) =
U
s
(c; s(a;A))
U
c
(c; s(a;A))
s
a
(a;A)




a=A
:
The rst equality follows from
s
a
(a; a) =
'
0
(1)
a  a
; (44)
which is easily veried by evaluating (36) at (a;A) = (a; a):
s
a
(a; a) = '
0

a  a
a  a

1
a  a
=
'
0
(1)
a  a
:
The second equality then follows from
s(a; a) = '

a  a
a  a

= ' (1) : (45)
5.6 The properties of s
a
(a; a)
On page 10 we state that
ds
a
(a; a)
da
= s
aa
(a; a) + s
aA
(a; a) =  
1
(a  a)
2
'
0
(1) < 0: (46)
In the following, we will give two proofs, a very simple and straightforward one and a second
one that yields the additional information why the second derivative of the function ' does
not play any role in a symmetric states.
Proof #1: Taking the total derivative of (44) with respect to a we obtain (46) directly.
Proof #2: Dierentiation of (36) with respect to A yields
s
aA
(a;A) =  
1
(A  a)
2

'
00

a  a
A  a

a  a
A  a
+ '
0

a  a
A  a

: (47)
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Evaluating both (37) and (47) at (a;A) = (a; a), we obtain
s
aa
(a; a) =
1
(a  a)
2
'
00
(1) ; (48)
s
aA
(a; a) =  
1
(a  a)
2

'
00
(1) + '
0
(1)

: (49)
From (48) and (49), it follows that (46) holds. Note that the expressions which include '
00
cancel out.
5.7 The transversality condition of our model
On page 10 we state that the transversality condition of our model can be written as
lim
t!1

a (t) exp

 
Z
t
0
r
e
(r

; c(v); a(v)) dv

= 0. (50)
Proof: Equation (11),
_
 = (  r

)   U
s
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a   a
;
can be rewritten as
_
 = (  r

)  

U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a

U
c
(c; '(1)): (51)
Using (10), U
c
(c; '(1)) = , (51) can be rewritten as
_
 =

 

r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a

: (52)
Using denition of the eective rate of return r
e
given in (14),
r
e
(r

; c; a)  r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
;
the dierential equation (52) can also be written as
_
 =   [r
e
(r

; c; a)  ] : (53)
Integration of (53) yields
 (t) =  (0) e
t
exp

 
Z
t
0
r
e
(r

; c(v); a(v)) dv

: (54)
Since  (0) = U
c
(c(0); '(1)) > 0 due to the assumption that U
c
> 0, the transversality
condition given on page 7, lim
t!1
e
 t
a = 0, holds if and only if the condition (50) is
satised.
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5.8 The derivation of the pair of dierential equations (19)
The dynamic evolution of a and c over time is governed by the pair of dierential equations
(12) and (13):
_a = r

a+ ~w   (g + r

b
0
)  c; (55)
_c = c
e
(c)[r
e
(r

; c; a)  ]: (56)
In general, linearizing a pair of dierential equations _a = _a (a; c) and _c = _c (a; c) about a
steady state (~a; ~c), in which _a(~a; ~c) = _c(~a; ~c) = 0 holds, yields
_a (a; c) =
@ _a
@a
(~a; ~c) (a  ~a) +
@ _a
@c
(~a; ~c) (c  ~c) ; (57)
_c (a; c) =
@ _c
@a
(~a; ~c) (a  ~a) +
@ _c
@c
(~a; ~c) (c  ~c) : (58)
Dierentiating (55) and (56) with respect to a and c we obtain:
@ _a
@a
= r

;
@ _a
@c
=  1; (59)
@ _c
@a
= c
e
(c) r
e
a
(c; a) ;
@ _c
@c
=
d [c
e
(c)]
dc
[r
e
(r

; c; a)   ] + c
e
(c) r
e
c
(c; a) : (60)
Evaluation of (60) at the steady state (~a; ~c), in which r
e
(r

; ~c; ~a) =  holds, yields
@ _c
@a
(~a; ~c) = ~c
e
(~c) r
e
a
(~c; ~a) ;
@ _c
@c
= ~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a) : (61)
Using (57), (58), (59), and (61), it follows that under the linear approximation the dynamic
evolution of a and c is governed by (19),
0
B
@
_a
_c
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
r

 1
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a) ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
1
C
A
0
B
@
a  ~a
c  ~c
1
C
A
:
5.9 Footnote 15 { Proof
In footnote 15 we state that
[tr (J)]
2
  4 det (J) = [r

  ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a):
Proof: Using (22),
tr (J) = r

+ ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a) > 0, det (J) = ~c
e
(~c)[r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)];
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we obtain
[tr (J)]
2
  4 det (J)
= [r

+ ~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c) [r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)]
= (r

)
2
+ 2r

~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + [~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c) r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
 4~c
e
(~c) r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
= (r

)
2
  2~c
e
(~c) r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + [~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c) r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
= [r

  ~c
e
(~c) r
e
c
(~c; ~a)]
2
  4~c
e
(~c) r
e
a
(~c; ~a) :
5.10 The solution to (19) and the stable arm (23)
In the following we will restrict attention to the case in which the steady state (~a; ~c) is a
saddlepoint so that 
1
< 0 and 
2
> 0 holds. Eigenvectors corresponding to the roots 
1
and 
2
are given by
0
B
@
1
r

  
1
1
C
A
and
0
B
@
1
r

  
2
1
C
A
;
respectively. Hence, the general solution to (19) takes the following form:
0
B
@
a
c
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
~a
~c
1
C
A
+D
1
0
B
@
1
r

  
1
1
C
A
e

1
t
+D
2
0
B
@
1
r

  
2
1
C
A
e

2
t
:
where D
1
and D
2
are constants to be determined. Employing the initial condition and the
transversality condition we obtain D
1
= a
0
 ~a and D
2
= 0. Hence, in the linearized model
the solution is given by
0
B
@
a
c
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
~a
~c
1
C
A
+ (a
0
  ~a)
0
B
@
1
r

  
1
1
C
A
e

1
t
:
Using (20),
(r

  )[~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  ] + ~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a) = 0;
this solution can also be written as
0
B
@
a
c
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
~a
~c
1
C
A
+ (a
0
  ~a)
0
B
@
1
 
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c;~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c;~a) 
1
1
C
A
e

1
t
:
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From these two alternative representations of the solution, it follows that there are two
alternative representations of the stable arm given, i.e., those given in (23):
c  ~c = (r

  
1
)(a  ~a) =  
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a):
5.11 Proof of (24)
In this subsection we will verify the validity of equation (24),
r
e
(r

; c; a)    =
(r

  
1
)
1
~c
e
(~c)
(a  ~a) =  

1
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a); (62)
which describes the co-movement of r
e
and a along the stable arm.
Proof: A linear approximation of r
e
(r

; c; a) about a steady state (~c; ~a), in which
r
e
(r

; ~c; ~a) =  holds, yields
r
e
(r

; c; a)    = r
e
c
(~c; ~a) (c  ~c) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a) (a  ~a) : (63)
First, substitution of the rst equality in (23), c  ~c = (r

  
1
)(a  ~a), into (63) yields
r
e
(r

; c; a)    = [r
e
c
(~c; ~a) (r

  
1
) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)] (a  ~a): (64)
From (20), i.e., 0 = (r

  )[~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  ] + ~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a), it follows that
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)(r

  
1
) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a) =
(r

  
1
)
1
~c
e
(~c)
: (65)
Substitution of (65) into (64) yields
r
e
(r

; c; a)    =
(r

  
1
)
1
~c
e
(~c)
(a  ~a);
which equals the rst equality in (24) [= (62)].
Substitution of the second equality in (23),
c  ~c =  
~c
e
(~c)r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a);
into (63) yields
r
e
(r

; c; a)    =

 
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a) r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
+ r
e
a
(~c; ~a)

(a  ~a)
=  

1
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a)  
1
(a  ~a): (66)
Obviously, (66) coincides with the second equality in (24) [= (62)].
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5.12 The properties of the utility function (25)
If U (c; s) takes the form given by (25),
U(c; s) =
1
1  


c

s


1 
  1

;
then
U
c
(c; s) = c
 [1 (1 )]
s
(1 )
; (67)
U
s
(c; s) = c
(1 )
s
 [1 (1 )]
; (68)
U
cc
(c; s) =   [1   (1  )] c
 [2 (1 )]
s
(1 )
; (69)
U
ss
(c; s) =   [1   (1  )]c
(1 )
s
 [2 (1 )]
;
U
cs
(c; s) =  (1  ) c
 [1 (1 )]
s
 [1 (1 )]
;
U
cc
(c; s)U
ss
(c; s)  [U
cs
(c; s)]
2
= [1  ( + ) (1  )] c
 2[1 (1 )]
s
 2[1 (1 )]
:
Our assumptions  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, 1 (1 ) > 0, 1 (1 )  0, and 1 (+)(1 
)  0 ensure that U (c; s) satises all properties listed in (1), U
c
> 0, U
s
> 0, U
cc
< 0,
U
ss
 0, and U
cc
U
ss
  U
2
cs
 0. Moreover, our assumptions ensure that both (2) and (3)
hold:
U
sc
U
c
  U
s
U
cc
= c
 2[1 (1 )]
s
 [1 2(1 )]
> 0;
lim
c!0
U
c
(c; s) = lim
c!0
 
s
(1 )
c
1 (1 )
!
=1; lim
c!1
U
c
(c; s) = lim
c!1
 
s
(1 )
c
1 (1 )
!
= 0:
5.13 The solutions for 
e
and r
e
in the parameterized model
Evaluating (67){(69) at (c; s) = (c; '(1)) and substituting the resulting expressions into
the denitions of 
e
and r
e
given in (14),

e
(c)   
U
c
(c; '(1))
cU
cc
(c; '(1))
; r
e
(r

; c; a)  r

+
U
s
(c; '(1))
U
c
(c; '(1))
'
0
(1)
a  a
;
we obtain

e
=  
c
 [1 (1 )]
[' (1)]
(1 )
 c [1   (1  )] c
 [2 (1 )]
[' (1)]
(1 )
=
1
1   (1  )
> 0; (70)
r
e
= r

+
c
(1 )
[' (1)]
 [1 (1 )]
c
 [1 (1 )]
[' (1)]
(1 )
'
0
(1)
a  a
= r

+
'
0
(1)
' (1)
c
a  a
: (71)
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Introducing the denition   ['
0
(1)] ='(1), the solution for r
e
can be written as
r
e
= r

+ (=)
c
a  a
; (72)
which equals (26).
5.14 The solutions for tr (J) and det (J) in the parameterized model
From (72), it follows that the partial derivatives of r
e
with respect to c and a are given by
r
e
c
(c; a) = (=)
1
a  a
> 0; (73)
r
e
a
(c; a) =   (=)
c
(a  a)
2
< 0: (74)
Evaluating (73) and (74) at the steady-state values (~a; ~c) [see (28) and (29)], which can
be rewritten as
~a = a+
=
  [1 + (=)]r

[r

a+ ~w   r

b
0
  g] ; (75)
~c =
  r

  [1 + (=)]r

[r

a+ ~w   r

b
0
  g] ; (76)
we obtain:
r
e
c
(~c; ~a) =
  [1 + (=)]r

r

a+ ~w   r

b
0
  g
; (77)
r
e
a
(~c; ~a) =  
(  r

) f  [1 + (=)]r

g
(=) [r

a+ ~w   r

b
0
  g]
; (78)
r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a) =  
f  [1 + (=)]r

g
2
(=) [r

a+ ~w   r

b
0
  g]
: (79)
Substitution of (70) and (76){(79) into (22),
tr (J) = r

+ ~c
e
(~c)r
e
c
(~c; ~a), det (J) = ~c
e
(~c)[r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)];
yields the expressions that are given on page 17:
tr (J) = r

+
  r

1   (1  )
; det (J) =  
(  r

) f  [1 + (=)]r

g
[1   (1  )] (=)
:
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5.15 The dependence of j
1
j on 
On page 17 we state that, \It is straightforward to calculate that @j
1
j=@ < 0".
Proof: Since det (J) < 0, the solution for the negative root can be written as

1
=
1
2

tr (J) 
q
[tr (J)]
2
+ 4 jdet (J)j

< 0:
Writing jdet (J)j as
jdet (J)j =
  r

1   (1  )

  r

=
  r


;
it is obvious that @ jdet (J)j =@ < 0. Since tr (J) is independent of , it is clear that
@
1
=@ > 0, which proves that @ j
1
j =@ < 0.
5.16 The long-run eects of scal shocks (general framework)
The steady-state values ~a and ~c are implicitly determined by (31),
~c = r

~a+ ~w   (r

b
0
+ g), r
e
(r

; ~c; ~a) = ; (80)
where
~w = ~w(r

; B), ~w
r

=  
~
k < 0, ~w
B
= f(
~
k) > 0; (81)
holds according to (9). Dierentiation of (80) with respect to g yields
@~c
@g
= r

@~a
@g
  1; r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
@~c
@g
+ r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
@~a
@g
= 0:
Solving for @~c=@g and @~a=@g, we obtain (32)
@~a
@g
=  
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	
< 0,
@~c
@g
=
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
	
=  

1 +
r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	

<  1;
where
	 =   [r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a) + r
e
a
(~c; ~a)] =  
det(J)
~c
e
(~c)
> 0:
The inequalities given above follow from r
e
c
> 0, r
e
a
< 0 and the fact that we restrict
attention to the case in which the steady state is a saddlepoint.
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5.17 The long-run eects of productivity shocks (general framework)
Dierentiation of (80) with respect to B yields
@~c
@B
= r

@~a
@B
+
@ ~w
@B
; r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
@~c
@B
+ r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
@~a
@B
= 0:
Solving for @~c=@B and @~a=@B, we nd (34):
@~a
@B
=
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	
@ ~w
@B
> 0;
@~c
@B
=
 r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
	
@ ~w
@B
=

1 +
r

r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
	

@ ~w
@B
>
@ ~w
@B
:
5.18 The long-run eects of changes in r

and  (general framework)
The long-run eects of changes in r

and  are mentioned only in footnote 27. Dieren-
tiating (80) with respect to r

and taking into account that ~w
r

=  
~
k and r
e
r

= 1, we
obtain
@~c
@r

= ~a+ r

@~a
@r

 
~
k   b
0
; 1 + r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
@~c
@r

+ r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
@~a
@r

= 0:
Solving for @~c=@r

and @~a=@r

, we obtain
@~a
@r

=
r
e
c
(~c; ~a)

~a  b
0
 
~
k

+ 1
	
,
@~c
@r

=  
r
e
a
(~c; ~a)

~a  b
0
 
~
k

  r

	
:
Dierentiation of (80) with respect to  yields
@~c
@
= r

@~a
@
; r
e
c
(~c; ~a)
@~c
@
+ r
e
a
(~c; ~a)
@~a
@
= 1:
Solving for @~c=@ and @~a=@, we nd
@~a
@
=  
1
	
< 0;
@~c
@
=  
r

	
< 0:
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